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<td><img alt="Dissertation Defense Announcement at the Cullen College of Engineering" width="600" height="171" src="https://www.egr.uh.edu/sites/www.egr.uh.edu/files/enews/2022/images/dissertation1.png">
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<div style="line-height:28px"><b><font size="6"><font color="#cc0000">Contract Theory Framework for Cryptoeconomics</font><font color="#c8102e"> </font></font></b></div>
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<div style="font-size:18px; margin-bottom:5px"><strong>Jing Li</strong></div>
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April 25th, 2022; 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (CST)</p>
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April 26th, 2022; 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (CST)<br>
Zoom: <span style="font-family:Roboto,RobotoDraft,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif"><a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://uofh.zoom.us/j/99146061274__;!!LkSTlj0I!DHfede9oQpdvYbvyCVZFYyyhiGqhubmPziYvJwbD0hEW2SpVmGRw4LYYDfVpAmH2Ob4ddbCUMUNEoI8pvhJayuyl$" data-auth="NotApplicable">https://uofh.zoom.us/j/99146061274</a></span></p>
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<strong>Committee Chair:</strong><br>
Zhu Han, Ph.D.<br>
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<strong>Committee Members:</strong><br>
Miao Pan, Ph.D. | Weidong Shi, Ph.D. | Hien Nguyen, Ph.D. | Dusit Niyato, Ph.D. | XiaoPing Zhang, Ph.D.</p>
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<strong>Abstract</strong></p>
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Cryptoeconomics is the research on how incentives should construct a decentralized and distributed cryptographic system. Economic incentives are used to motivate the efforts and govern the allocation of resources in the cryptoeconomic ecosystem, ensuring specific
types of information security qualities. Compared to the costly and time-consuming cryptography, incentives obtained through game theory are much more cost-efficient and easier to implement. However, there lacks sufficient research on the incentive issue of
cryptoeconomics. We investigate the various incentives of blockchain networks to fill in the gaps in cryptoeconomics research. The first research focuses on the blockchain network with shards and adopts the security-deposit-based consensus protocol, studying
the problem of how to balance the security incentive and the economic incentive. The contract theory is utilized to formulate the problem between temporary blockchain leaders and validators. Compared with fixed deposits, flexible deposits can provide sufficient
financial incentives for the participants without losing the security incentives. In the second work, we adopt the cyber insurance idea and propose the insurance contract to help determine the withdrawal delay and the insurance claim to relieve the loss of
victims. Specifically, instead of requiring the insurance premium from the validators, the cyber insurer first signs the contract with the blockchain representative (e.g., beacon chain). Then the blockchain representative would sign a series of contracts with
the validators. Through the simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed model can provide adaptive insurance contracts for the different validators and keep the profits of the blockchain network and the cyber insurer. In the last work, we propose a random-contract-based
scheme to maximize the service provider's revenue and assign the service buyers the feasible service price under the framework of a sidechain linked to the public blockchain. We systematically demonstrate random contracts' superiority under the increasing
absolute risk-aversion assumption. The simulation results show that random contracts can provide more significant revenue for sidechains by an average of 24.70% compared to deterministic contracts. Efficient service payments can be reduced by an average of
44.65% compared to the main chain's cost.<br>
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<td><img alt="Engineered For What's Next" width="600" height="82" src="https://www.egr.uh.edu/sites/www.egr.uh.edu/files/enews/2022/images/dissertation2.png"></td>
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