[CCoE Notice] Cullen College Dissertation Announcement

[Hutchinson, Inez A]

[Dissertation Defense Announcement at the Cullen College of Engineering]
Incentive Mechanism Design for Blockchain Networks
Bridging Decentralized Exchanges, Web 3.0, and the Metaverse
Daniel Mawunyo Doe
June 20, 2024; 8:00 AM - 9:30 AM (CST)
Location: ECE Conference Room N328 (Onsite)
Zoom: https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://uh-edu-cougarnet.zoom.us/j/99146061274__;!!LkSTlj0I!CWg7qCmrUZIfsxQ6a4UXF_3sGkf3WWyQMfQ_t-rMKebTWeujo8790v90KsAGVxASzg2n_BLD8OTzOW2S1is5tSWVDqs$ 
Committee Chair:
Miao Pan, Ph.D.
Committee Members:
David Mayerich, Ph.D. | Yuqing Hu, Ph.D. | Niyato Dusit, Ph.D. | Zhu Han, Ph.D.
Abstract
In the rapidly evolving landscape of blockchain technology, Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) and the burgeoning domains of Web 3.0 and the Metaverse are presenting both unprecedented opportunities and challenges. This thesis delves into three pivotal works that collectively address some of the paramount challenges. The first work proposes an innovative incentive mechanism for DEXs to tackle issues like frontrunning and transaction reordering. By employing a multi-dimensional contract-theoretic approach and implementing it on a decentralized oracle network, the proposed mechanism significantly enhances miner utility and reduces user costs, thus reinforcing DEX integrity and efficiency. The second work expands the discussion to Web 3.0 and the Metaverse, emphasizing the role of blockchain full nodes. A contract-theoretic incentive mechanism is introduced to mitigate resource intensity and operational costs, incentivizing users to support network growth and enhancing overall utility. Finally, the third work addresses challenges related to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) and timing games, leveraging a Contract-Stackelberg framework to manage information asymmetry and optimize strategic interactions between validators and the blockchain. Empirical analysis demonstrates significant improvements in blockchain utility and validators' utility, highlighting the effectiveness of the proposed framework in enhancing network efficiency and participation rates.
[Engineered For What's Next]


Daniel Mawunyo Doe, Ph.D. Student
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
W319, Engineering Building 2
4800 Calhoun Road
University of Houston
Houston, TX 77004-4005
Tele: (346)-901-3651
dmdoe at uh.edu
MSc.  Computer Science and Technology, UESTC
BSC. Computer Engineering, KNUST
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